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Aliens-Refusal to Take Judicial Notice That the Communist
Party Advocates the Violent Overthrow of the Government-
Deportation warrant was issued solely on the finding that the alien was a
member of the communist party.1 Held, that the evidence was insufficient
to support the warrant since it was not proven that the organization in
question was one ". . . that . . .believes in, . . . or advocates . . . the
overthrow by force or violence of the Government of the United States,
. . ."3 Strecker v. Kessler, 95 F. (2d) 976 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938)3 cert.
granted, 6 U. S. L. WEEK 152 (1938).
Although a long line of decisions have held, on evidence sufficient
under the lax rules applicable to deportation proceedings, 4 that the com-
munist party is within the class proscribed by the instant statute,5 the
Court's refusal to take judicial notice of this fact cannot be called unwar-
ranted. Even though the tenets of such a group are a subject of judicial
notice,6 the exercise of the power is, in this type of case, purely optional 7
and in view of the summary nature of the deportation proceeding," it was
not arbitrary to require proof that the goal of the organization had not
changed. The recent political activity of the party, judicially noticed by
the court in the instant case,5 suggests that possibly constitutional means
are to be used to accomplish its ends. Furthermore, the constant fight
carried on by the communists for the preservation of the constitutional
rights of free speech and press 10 casts doubt on the contention that their
objective is the violent overthrow of the government deriving its powers
from that same constitution. This is strengthened by the fact that the
activity of the party at the present time seems primarily to be directed at
the immediate improvement of the situation of the masses by forcing con-
cessions from the "capitalistic class" and the government they control, in
I. A copy of THE COMMUNIST, a magazine published monthly by the party was
also in evidence, but the court stated that it proved nothing.
2. 40 STAT. 1012 (i918), as amended by 41 STAT. 1009 (I920), 8 U. S. C. A. § 137c
(1927).
3. A rehearing was denied, 96 F. (2d) 1020 (C. C. A. 5th, 1938), at which time a
dissenting opinion was filed to the specific refusal to take judicial notice. Accord: EX
parte Fierstein, 41 F. (2d) 53 (C. C. A. 9th, 193o). But see Murdoch v. Clark, 53 F.
(2d) 155 (C. C. A. xst, 1931) ; United States ex rel. Fortmueller v. Commissioner, I4
F. Supp. 484 (S. D. N. Y. 1936). But cf. United States ex rel. Boric v. Marshall, 4 F.
Supp. 965 (W. D. Pa. 1933).
4. It is generally stated that there must be some evidence to support the finding.
See CLARx, DEPORTATION OF ALIENS FROM THE UNITED STATES TO EuRoPE (1931)
321; VAN VLEcK, THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL OF ALIENS (1932) 194.
5. Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 Fed. 129 (C. C. A. Ist, 1922) ; Antolish v. Paul, 283
Fed. 957 (C. C. A. 7th, 1922) ; Ex parte Jurgans, 17 F. (2d) 507 (D. Minn. 1927) ;
Vilarino v. Garrity, 50 F. (2d) 582 (C. C. A. 9th, 1931); Bilokumsky v. Tod, 57 F.
(2d) 707 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932) ; Berkman v. Tillinghast, 58 F. (2d) 928 (C. C. A. 9th,
1932) ; Sormunen v. Nagle, 59 F. (2d) 398 (C. C. A. 9th, 1932) ; Kjar v. Doak, 6r F.
(2d) 566 (C. C. A. 7th, 1932); In re Sanderquist, ii F. Supp. 525 (D. Me. 1935).
6. Rider v. Braxton County Court, 74 W. Va. 712, 82 S. E. IO83 (1914). See also
Varcoe v. Lee, i8o Cal. 338, 181 Pac. 223 (I919), for a clear statement of what is neces-
sary before the courts will take judicial notice.
7. 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) §§ 2568, 2579.
8. See VAN VLECK, op. cit. supra note 4; Oppenheimer, Recent Developments in
the Deportation Process (1938) 36 MIcH. L. REV. 355.
9. Instant case at 978.
Io. See Communist Party Platform (1936), reprinted in Loucxs AND HoOT, Com-
PARATIVE EcONo Ic SYSTEMS (1938) 757, 762.
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the form of labor legislation and industrial agreements;"1 this would seem
to indicate that the party is now resigned to seeking the accomplishment
of its social goals under the present form of government. However, a
distinction should be made between the present and long range objectives
of the party, and there is ample evidence that the apparent change is indic-
ative not of a change in the ultimate goal, but merely in the immediate
one, intended primarily to enable the party to grow without opposition until
they are in a position to carry out the original revolutionary plan.12 Under
the "United Front" policy adopted several years ago, it appears that all
the working masses are to be united against capitalism, and ultimately,
when the masses are under the complete domination of the communists,
the revolution will be accomplished.13 Although advocacy of such an ulti-
mate aim would bring the alien members within the statute,14 it is to be
questioned, in view of the change, whether the true objectives of the party
are any longer so notorious as to be the subject of judicial notice.' 5 In
fact, the communists themselves appear at times to be confused as to the
exact nature of their goal.18 In any event, since the deportation proceed-
ings involve some of the most important of human rights, 7 it is better
that the evidence requirements, already too lax, be strictly enforced.' 8
Conflict of Laws-Corporation as an "Operator" Within the
Meaning of Statute to Give Personal Jurisdiction Over Non-Resident
Motorists-Plaintiff was injured by the agent of defendant, a non-
resident corporation, who was driving an automobile for and on behalf of
ii. See BROWDER, WHAT is CoMMuNISM (1936) cc. 9-12; LoucKs AN) Hoor, op.
cit. mpra note io, at 760.
12. See BROWDER, op. cit. supra note ii, at 162 et seq.; BROWDER, COMMUNISM IN
THE UNITED STATES (1935) 215; FOSTER, TowARD SoviEr AMERICA (1932) 218; MAN-
IFESTO OF THE EIGHTH CONVENTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE U. S. A.
(1934) ; "The revolutionary way out of the crisis begins with the fight for unemploy-
ment insurance . . . through demonstrations, strikes, general strikes, leading up to
the seizure of power, to the destruction of capitalism by a revolutionary workers' gov-
ernment.", id. at 23; WoREas LBRARY PUBLISHERS, PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST
INTERNATIONAL (1936) 91; Theses of the XIII Plenum of the E. C. C. I. (I934) 13
THE COMMUNIST 144; Brown, The Importance of the Recruting Drive (1937) i6 THE
COMMUNIST 922, 923; The Communist Party and Its Activities in the United States,
79 CONG. REC. 752 (1935) ; Election Platform of the Communist Party of New York
State (934) ; Carrol, Aliens in Subversive Activities, SAT. EvE. POST, Feb. 22, 1936,
p. Io. Cf. N. Y. Times, May 29, 1938, § 4, P. 7, col. 3.
13. See supra note 12.
14. United States ex rel. Georgian v. Uhl, 271 Fed. 677 (C. C. A. 2d, 1921).
15. See 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2571.
I6. Compare the following statements from BROWDER, -WHAT IS COMMUNISM
(1936) : "It must be emphasized that capitalism will not simply come to an end; it can
only be ended by the organized actions of the working class in collaboration with its
allies from other sections of the population", id. at 162; "The revolution does not sim-
ply happen; it must be made. . . . The socialist revolution is carried out by the
great mass of toilers. The Communist Party, as the vanguard of the most conscious
toilers, acts as their organizer and guide", id. at 163; "But soldiers and sailors come
from the ranks of the workers. They can be, and must be, won for the revolution. All
revolutions have been made with weapons which the overthrown riders had relied on
for their protection", id. at 165; "Communists, despite what their enemies say, do not
advocate or idealize violence", id. at 166; "We Communists propose to reverse the
present situation, to provide democracy for all the toilers and dictatorship against the
bankers, monopolists and other capitalist racketeers", id. at 168.
17. See Oppenheimer, supra note 8.
I8. Cf. (1936) 84 U. oF PA. L. REV. IO2O.
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the corporation within Illinois. An Illinois statute 1 provides that the "use
and operation by a non-resident of a motor vehicle" within the state gives
the state personal jurisdiction, through a substituted service, to render judg-
ment in all actions growing out of such operation. Defendant having re-
ceived such substituted service appeared specially to contest the jurisdiction.
Held, that the state has no jurisdiction, for the statute only includes persons
who are personally operating the motor vehicle. Jones v. Pebler, 16 N. E.
(2d) 438 (App. Ct. Ill. 1938).
Since the Rhode Island case of Clesas v. Hurley Machine Co.2 appeared
in this REVIEW, a number of the state courts of last resort have construed
the meaning of "operate" in relation to these statutes. When the New York
Court of Appeals in O'Tier v. Sell - reversed the Appellate Division and
reached the result of the instant case, almost all jurisdictions followed its
interpretation. 4  The usual reaction has been for the legislature to amend
its statute, thereby clearly indicating its intention to include operation by
an agent. 5 Inasmuch as the instant interpretation excludes all corpora-
tions from the effect of the statute, against whom all the purposes of the
statute certainly have application, it seems odd that the court would give
such a narrow construction to the meaning of "operate." 6
Constitutional Law-Validity of Legislative Investigations Under
the Separation of Powers Doctrine-A grand jury was directed to
investigate charges of criminal misconduct of civil officers. The Pennsyl-
vania Legislature passed acts which prohibited any grand jury investigation
of such charges against any civil officer liable to impeachment before an
investigation thereof by the House of Representatives, and retroactively
suspended any investigation of the charges until after the investigation by
the House. Held, that in so far as they interfered with the grand jury
investigation, the acts 1 were unconstitutional as an invasion of judicial
powers and the two investigations may be conducted at once.2 In re Inves-
tigation by the September 1938 Dauphin County Grand Jury, Phila. Legal
Intelligencer, Oct. 4, 1938, p. I, col. 2 (Pa. 1938) .
i. ILL. REv. STAT. (Cahill, 1933) c. 95a, §21 (I).
2. 52 R. I. 69, 157 At. 426 (1931), 8o U. OF PA. L. REV. go9 (1932).
3. 252 N. Y. 400, i69 N. E. 624 (193o).
4- Morrow v. Asher, 55 F. (2d) 365 (D. C. Tex. 1932) ; Day v. Bush, 18 La. App.
682, 139 So. 42 (1932) ; Brown v. Cleveland Traction Co., 265 Mich. 475, 251 N. W.
557 (1933), 13 MicH. B. J. 194 (I934); seinble Riccio v. Niagara Cotton Co., 47 York
7o (Pa. C. P. 1931). Contra, Producers' & Refiners' Corp. v. Illinois Cent. Ry., 168 Tenn.
I, 73 S. W. (2d) 174 (1934).
5. Instant case at 442.
6. See Culp, Process in Actions Against Non-Resident Motorists (1934) 32 MIcH.
L. REV. 325, 345 (this article contains a careful study of the statutes in this field).
i. Pa. Laws Spec. Sess. 1938, No. 1, 4. The court expressly declared invalid only
Act No. 4, which was retroactive in force, although the reasoning applied to Act No. i
as well.
2. Jurisdiction of the case was retained in order to solve possible future conflicts
between the two bodies operating simultaneously.
3. In a separate opinion the court held valid an act, Pa. Laws Spec. Sess. 1938,
No. 3, which empowers the attorney general in his absolute discretion to supersede a
district attorney in any proceeding before a Court of Quarter Sessions, providing such
court may remove the attorney general if he is incapable of acting impartially. The
court declared this Act to be a restatement of the powers of the attorney general at
common law. See Commonwealth ex rel. Minerd v. Margiotti, 325 Pa. 17, 188 Atl. 524
(1936), 85 U. OF PA. L. REv. 538 (1937) ; De Long, Powers and Duties of the State
Attorney-General in Criminal Prosecution (1934) 25 J. CRI. L. 358.
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The New Jersey House of Assembly passed a resolution establishing
a committee to investigate charges of fraudulent and illegal conduct by mem-
bers of election boards in the 1937 general election ". . . and to report
its findings as a basis for such legislative action as the General Assembly
may deem necessary." Held (three justices dissenting), that the resolution
was unconstitutional as a usurpation of judicial functions, since the charges
concern criminal conduct of individuals. McRell v. Kelly, N. J. Ct. Errors
and App., Oct. 17, 1938, aff'g without opinion, Ex parte Kelly, 198 Atl.
203 (N. J. Ch. 1938).
By implication, constitutions are said to vest in each branch of govern-
ment such subsidiary powers as are requisite to the execution of its ultimate
function.4 Thus a legislature may conduct investigations for purposes
which will aid in discharging legislative functions, and on this warrant
courts have upheld the validity of inquiries of varied sorts.5 On the other
hand, the doctrine of separation of powers has been held grounds for in-
validating investigations where the body appointing the investigatory com-
mittee was without power to legislate on the subject inquired into,6 or where
the court has felt that the sole purpose of the investigation was to inquire
into the criminality of individuals, which is a judicial function.7 But the
possibility of incidental divulgence of criminality should not be grounds for
invalidation where it can reasonably be said that the investigation is pri-
marily directed at an evil which it is within the legislative power to
remedy." To be sure, there is danger that the investigation will be used as
a vicious political inquisition of individuals in the guise of a legitimate legis-
lative inquiry. Yet the publication of important facts otherwise unrevealed
and their effect in making possible more enlightened legislation 9 are justifi-
cation for sanctioning an investigation where a legislative function is in-
volved. It is difficult to understand, therefore, on what valid grounds the
New Jersey court prohibited an inquiry which might well have revealed
facts pertinent to the legislative function of regulating the conduct of elec-
tions. Such inquiries would appear to be unhampered by the separation of
4. See i COOLEY, CoNsTITUrTioAL LImITATIoNs (8th ed. 1927) 138, 176.
5. Ex parte Battelle, 207 Cal. 227, 277 Pac. 725 (1929) (cement trust) ; Burnham
v. Morrissey, 8o Mass. 226 (1859) (state liquor dispensary) ; Attorney General v. Bris-
senden, 271 Mass. 172, 171 N. E. 82 (193o) (city governmental department under state
control); Keeler v. McDonald, 99 N. Y. 463, 2 N. E. 6,5 (1885) (same); Terrell v.
King, 118 Tex. 237, 14 S. W. (2d) 786 (1929) (tax survey) ; State ex rel. Rosenhein
v. Frear, 138 Wis. x73, ii9 N. W. 894 (19o9) (primary elections for federal office).
6. United States v. Owlett, I5 F. Supp. 736 (M. D. Pa. 1936), 85 U. OF PA. L.
REV. 226 (state investigation of W. P. A. invalid) ; State ex rel. Robertson Realty Co.
v. Guilbert, 75 Ohio St. 1, 78 N. E. 931 (19o6) ; Ex parte Wolters, 64 Tex. Cr. 238,
144 S. W. 531 (911).
7. Greenfield v. Russell, 292 Ill. 392, 127 N. E. 1O2 (192o) ; Ex parte Hague, 9
N. J. Misc. 89, i5o AtI. 322 (Ct. Errors and App. i93o). The Hague case was relied
on by the Court of Chancery as authority for its decision in the instant New Jersey
case. Compare McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135 (927), with the Hague case and
the instant New Jersey case.
8. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 179-18O (1927), cited supra note 7.
"We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate
object, if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the
contrary was intended." Keeler v. McDonald, 99 N. Y. 463, 487, 2 N. E. 615, 628
(885), cited supra note 5. Validation of an investigation which at its inception rea-
sonably appears to have a legislative purpose would seem justifiable, since subsequent
aberrations from that purpose may be avoided by those whose rights would be infringed
upon thereby. Herwitz and Mulligan, The Legislative Investigating Committee (1933)
33 CoL. L. REv. I, 17-23.
9. See McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U. S. 135, 175 (1927) ; Herwitz and Mulligan,
The Legislative Investigating Committee (933) 33 CoL. L. REv. 1, 5, n. 8.
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powers doctrine, and it has been so held in a similar situation.10 The Penn-
sylvania decision in allowing a legislative investigation of facts relevant to
impeachment would seem to rest on a sounder analysis of the constitutional
principles.11 On the other hand, the apparently unique attempt of the Penn-
sylvania Legislature to suspend the grand jury investigation was held to be
an infraction of the separation of powers doctrine. This part of the holding
would likewise appear to be justifiable, since in this provision the legislature
is not merely assuming additional powers incidental to its function, but also
is depriving the grand jury of its powers which are protected at least in-
directly by the constitution. 2 Just as it is difficult to perceive that the inci-
dental involvement of the criminality of individuals should invalidate an
investigation related to a legislative function, so it is not clear by what
authority the involvement of political issues vests in a legislature the power
to suspend a judicial investigation of criminality.
Constitutional Law-Validity of the Provisions of the Home
Owners' Loan Act Relating to Federal Savings and Loan Associa-
tions-Plaintiff is a federal savings and loan association organized
under § 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act,1 a statute designed to promote
a sound system of home mortgages. In the district court plaintiff obtained
an injunctive decree 2 directing defendants, the Attorney General and Bank-
ing Commission acting on behalf of the State of Wisconsin, to desist from
prosecuting a suit which they had instituted in the Wisconsin Supreme
Court to determine whether plaintiff could lawfully engage in the building
and loan business in Wisconsin without complying with the statutes of that
state.3 Held (one justice dissenting), that the injunction was properly
granted since Congress has the power to create corporations to act as fiscal
agents of the government,4 and for the further reason that the enactment
of § 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act was a valid exercise of the power
of Congress to make expenditures for the general welfare. First Federal
Io. State ex rel. Rosenhein v. Frear, 138 Wis. 173, ix9 N. W. 894 (19o9).
ii. "The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment."
PA. CoNsT. art. VI, § i. That the criminality of individuals may be investigated for
purposes of impeachment is recognized even in New Jersey in Ex parte Hague, 9 N. J.
Misc. 89, 94, 15o Atl. 322, 324 (Ct. Errors and App. I93O), cited supra note 7.
12. See instant case, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 4, 1938, p. 7, col. 2. It is
irrelevant to the present issue, therefore, that this mode of criminal investigation is
considered inefficient and outmoded by some authorities. Dession, From Indictment to
Infornzatioz--Implications of the Shift (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 163; Moley, The Use of
the Information in Criminal Cases (1931) 17 A. B. A. J. 292.
For analogous cases on reactions of courts to legislative encroachment on judicial
powers, see i COOLEY, op. cit. supra note 4, at 18o-187; Note (1938) 52 HMv. L. REv.
151.
I. 48 STAT. 132 (1933), as amended by 48 STAT. 645 (I934), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1464
(1936). Subsection (i) of section 5, insofar as it permitted the conversion of state
building and loan associations which were members of federal loan banks into federal
savings and loan associations by a vote of a majority of stockholders, was held invalid
in Hopkins Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U. S. 315 (1935).
2. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n of Wisconsin v. Finnegan, ig F. Supp. 678
(W. D. Wis. 1937).
3. Wis. STAT. (93) c. 215. The Banking Commission has authority to issue cer-
tificates of incorporation to building and loan associations, without which no such asso-
ciation may function within the state. Id. § 215.o2. It also has general supervision and
control over the business of such associations. Id. § 215.31.
4. Subsection (k) of the statute provided that savings and loan associations created
thereunder should act as fiscal agents of the government when so designated by the
Secretary of the Treasury. 48 STAT. 645 (1934), 12 U. S. C. A. § 1464 (k) (r936).
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Savings & Loan Association v. Loomis, 97 F. (2d) 831 (C. C. A. 7th,
1938).
In basing its decision upon the power of Congress to create fiscal
agents, the court followed Smith v. Kansas City T. & T. Co.,
5 which would
seem to be indistinguishable from the instant case. However the Smith
case has been criticized on the ground that such legislation should not be
upheld merely because fiscal powers have been granted to a corporation,
unless the exercise of such powers by the corporation is of substantial
importance to the government in carrying out its fiscal functions. 6  But
regardless of the validity of the first basis of the decision, the position of
the court in declaring the act constitutional under the general welfare clause
of the Constitution7 is eminently sound. The Supreme Court had never
been required to interpret the exact function of this provision until its recent
decision of United States v. Butler,5 wherein the court adopted the amil-
tonian interpretation 9 of the clause to the effect that the power of Congress
to levy taxes and hence make expenditures 10 for the general welfare is
independent of the powers subsequently enumerated.
1 The broad power
thus recognized is subject however to certain restrictions. One limitation
is to the effect that the taxes or expenditures must be for a national, as
distinct from a local, purpose. Despite the fact that the Home Owners'
Loan Act confers direct benefits upon individuals, a national purpose is
served since the legislation attempts to solve the home mortgage situation,
a problem which is national in scope when viewed comprehensively.'
2 The
Congressional power is further limited by the requirement that it must
appear that the primary purpose of the statute is the raising or expending
5. 255 U. S. i8o (1921).
6. See Nicholson, The Federal Spending Power (1934) 9 TzmP. L. Q. 3, 14. It
has been further pointed out that if this principle is carried to its logical extreme, Con-
gress could create a corporation to accomplish any purpose, and make the legislation
valid by a grant of fiscal powers having no relation to the primary purpose of the
statute. See Thurston, Government Proprietary Corporatons (1935) 21 VA. L. REV.
351, 355. It is significant that § 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act as originally en-
acted did not include a grant of fiscal powers. 48 STAT. 132 (1933). From this fact
the dissenting judge draws the conclusion that the amendment adding subsection (k)
to the statute, 48 STAT. 645 (934), was a mere pretext to accomplish what would
otherwise be prohibited. Instant case at 840.
7. "The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare
of the United States. . . ." U. S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. I.
8. 297 U. S. i (1936) (holding A. A. A. unconstitutional).
9. 4 WoRKs oF ALEXANDER HAmiLT N (Lodge ed. 1904) I5O. James Madison had
taken the contrary view that Congress can tax and appropriate only for the purpose of
carrying out the powers subsequently enumerated. THE FEDERALIST XLI. For an ex-
haustive analysis of this controversy, see Post, The Constitutionality of Government
Spending for the General Welfare (1935) 22 VA. L. Rzv. i.
io. The power to tax for the general welfare by implication authorizes expenditures
for the same purpose. See United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. I, 65 (1936).
ii. Id. at 66. This holding was merely a dictum but it formed the basis for the
decisions in the Social Security Cases. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548
(1937) ; Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 61g (937). It should be noted that the power
to t, x and spend for the general welfare is not a power to legislate generally for that
purpose. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, 292 (1936).
12. See instant case at 840. Legislation which directly benefited local projects
was upheld on the basis of the general welfare clause in Kansas Gas & Electric Co. v.
Independence, 79 F. (2d) 32 (C. C. A. ioth, 1935) ; Duke Power Co. v. Greenwood
County, 91 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 4th, 1937), affd, 302 U. S. 485 (938). Legislation
benefiting individuals was similarly sustained in Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 61g
(1937). In all of these cases, Congress had passed the legislation in question in an
endeavor to solve a nation-wide problem.
232 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
of funds rather than the coercive regulation of a matter reserved to the
states.1 s Since any regulation of state building and loan associations which
results from the operation of § 5 of the Home Owners' Loan Act is merely
incidental to the main purpose of the act, and since no coercion is involved,
the second requirement is clearly satisfied.1 4
Gold Clause-Applicability of Joint Resolution to Multiple Cur-
rency Clause and to Lease Requiring Payment in Grains of Gold-
Coupon bonds executed by railroad under deed of trust of which bank was
trustee contained a multiple currency clause.1 Bank filed claim for bond-
holders in railroad reorganization proceedings asserting right to payment
in dollars measured by Dutch guilders. Held, that payment in guilder
value should be denied because the clause comes within the joint Resolu-
tion.2  Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. Henwood, 98 F. (2d) I6o
(C. C. A. 8th, 1938), cert. granted Nov. 7, 1938. Accord: Chemical
Bank and Trust Co. v. Henwood, 98 F. (2d) 179 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
By 99-year lease beginning I89o, rent was to be paid until 1897 in
gold coin, thereafter in quarter-yearly installments of "139,320 grains of
pure unalloyed gold", with the option in lessors to require quarterly pay-
ment of $6ooo in currency instead of gold. For 43 years lessee paid quar-
terly by drafts. After enactment of the Joint Resolution, lessors demanded
payment in gold or the sum of $101,58.75 (the dollar value of gold in the
stipulated quantity). Lessee made payments under protest, then demanded,
and lessor refused, a refund. Lessee thereupon sued to have the gold stipu-
lation declared illegal and to enjoin lessor from collecting more than $6ooo
13. Hill v. Wallace, 259 U. S. 44 (1922) ; United States v. Constantine, 296 U. S.
287 (i935) ; United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. I (1936). The Court has, however, held
some acts of Congress valid wherein Congress used the taxing power for purposes which
manifestly had no relation to the raising of revenue. McCray v. United States, 195
U. S. 27 (1904) (tax on oleomargarine) ; United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86
(1919) (Narcotics Act) ; Nicholson, supra note 6, at 22. In explanation of such de-
cisions it has been suggested that the Court will uphold a statute which is primarily
regulatory if it feels that the subject matter of the regulation is essentially harmful or
anti-social. Holmes, The Federal Spending Power and State Rights (1936) 34 MIciH.
L. REv. 637, 644.
14. It is clear that a statute will be upheld if its administration involves only inci-
dental regulation bearing some relation to the fiscal need subserved by the tax or ex-
penditure. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U. S. 61g (1937) ; Langer v. United States, 76 F.
(2d) 817 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) ; Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Central Rep. T. Co.,
17 F. Supp. 263 (N. D. Ill. 1936).
i. The clause provided that the company promises to pay "at its office or agency
in the Borough of Manhattan, City and State of New York, One Thousand Dollars in
gold coin of the United States of America, of or equal to the standard of weight and
fineness as it existed January I, 1912, or in London, England, E205 15S 2d, or in Am-
sterdam, Holland, 249o guilders or in Berlin, Germany, marks 42oo, D. R. W., or in
Paris, France, 518o francs." Instant case at 162.
2. 48 STAT. 112 (933), 31 U. S. C. A. § 463 (Supp. 1938). "Every provision con-
tained in or made with respect to any obligation which purports to give the obligee a
right to require payment in gold or a particular kind of coin or currency of the United
States measured thereby, is declared to be against public policy. . . . Every obliga-
tion . . . shall be discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in legal tender. ...
As used in this resolution . . . 'obligation' means an obligation . . . payable in
money of the United States."
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and from forfeiting the lease as sought in lessors' cross-complaint.3 Held '
(one judge dissenting), that since the lease does not come within the Joint
Resolution, forfeiture should be decreed. Lessors must, however, ade-
quately compensate lessee for improvements. Emery Bird Thayer Dry
Goods Co. v. Williams, 98 F. (2d) 166 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
The court in the Guaranty Trust Co. case held that since the effect of
the multiple currency clause was "to freeze the unit of payment as of the
dollar" 5 of a specified weight and fineness, the clause comes within "the
evil to be remedied" by the Joint Resolution. This test was laid down by
the Supreme Court in Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing
Paper Co.,6 where the Resolution was held applicable to an obligation call-
ing for gold equal to $1,500 of the gold coin of the United States as of
1894, or its equivalent in currency. Other courts, however, faced with the
question of whether the Resolution is applicable to multiple currency clauses,
have taken the view that an obligation expressly payable in guilders is not
"payable in money of the United States" within the meaning of the Resolu-
tion.7 This conclusion is supported at length by Professor Nussbaum in
an earlier issue of the REviEw.5  As there pointed out, no hint can be
found in the Congressional data that Congress intended to impair such
provisions, and, furthermore, economically and politically there is a funda-
mental diversity between gold clauses and multiple currency clauses-a
diversity recognized by foreign courtsY On the other hand, Justice
Cardozo's language in the Holyoke case appears more applicable to a gold
bullion provision such as that in the Williams case. ". . . there is no call
for a stated number of ounces of fine gold, as if a goldsmith were providing
for the uses of his business." 10 Considering "the situation of the parties,
their business needs and expectations, in gauging their intention" " it seems
3. The lease contained in the following provision: "This lease is made upon the
condition that the lessee shall . . . keep and perform all its covenants . . . here-
under; and in case it fails . . . then . . . this lease shall be void, at the lessors'
option, and the lessors may thereupon, without further demand or notice, enter upon
said premises, and take possession thereof, and of all improvements thereon, forcibly if
necessary, without being guilty of trespass." Instant case at 174.
4. The lower court held that the Joint Resolution was inapplicable and, inconsist-
ently, although it was impossible to deliver gold, the lease was substantially complied
with by payment quarterly of $10,158.75. Emery Bird Thayer Dry Goods Co. v.
Williams, 15 F. Supp. 938 (W. D. Mo. 1936), 50 HAv. L. REv. 360, 46 YALE L. J.
348, 35 MIcH. L. REV. 667 (1937), 71 U. S. L. REv. i88, 190, 12 Wis. L. REv. 247.
The Circuit Court said this, in effect, was the writing of a new contract and is not
within the scope of equity's power to relieve from forfeiture.
5. Guaranty Trust Co. case at i65.
6. 300 U. S. 324 (1937).
7. Anglo-Continentale Treuhand A. G. v. St. Louis Southwestern Railway Co.,
81 F. (2d) ii (C. C. A. 2d, 1936); McAdoo v. Southern Pacific Co., io F. Supp. 953
(N. D. Cal. 1935), rev'd on other grounds, 82 F. (2d) 121 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936).
Contra: City Bank Farmers Co. v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 244 App. Div. 634, 28o N. Y.
Supp. 494 (ist Dep't, 1935) ; Anglo-Continentale Treuhand A. G. v. Southern Pacific
Co., i65 Misc. 562, 299 N. Y. Supp. 859 (Sup. Ct. 1936) ; Zurich General Accident &
Liability Insurance Co., Ltd. v. Lackawanna Steel Co., 164 Misc. 498, 299 N. Y. Supp.
862 (Sup. Ct. 1937).
8. Nussbaum, Multiple Currency and Index Clauses (1936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REv.
569.
9. Id. at 573 et seq.
io. Holyoke Water Power Co. v. American Writing Paper Co., 3oo U. S. 324, 335
(1937).
ii. Ibid.
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clear that the gold bullion clause served merely as a standard of value and
would, therefore, come within the Resolution.12
Jury-Right to Question Prospective Jurors as to Financial Inter-
est in Insurance Company-In an accident case, plaintiff's counsel
was permitted to ask prospective jurors on voir dire examination whether
they were financially interested in a named insurance company, which, as
insurer of defendant, was represented by counsel. Held (two justices
dissenting), that such inquiry was properly allowed since it was made in
good faith and without undue prejudice to defendant. Smithers v.
Henriquez, 15 N. E. (2d) 499 (Ill. 1938).
In the instant case the Illinois court has followed the rule of the vast
majority of jurisdictions that inquiry concerning a juror's interest in de-
fendant's insurer is proper if made in good faith for the purpose of dis-
covering possible bias,1 but that such examination cannot be introduced
merely for the purpose of informing the jurors that defendant is insured. 2
However the majority law has been criticized as in many ways unsatis-
factory.8 Questions of this nature convey to the jury the impression that
the ultimate loss will be borne by an insurance company and not by de-
fendant,4 and thus increase the likelihood of a verdict for the plaintiff.5
Not only is the right to make such an inquiry frequently abused due to
12. Dawson, Gold Clause Decisions (1935) 33 MicH. L. REv. 647, 669, n. 45. "It
follows from the text of the joint resolution that money obligations in which gold is
used as a standard of value are invalid. This would appear true whether gold coin or
gold bullion be used as a standard."
"The almost universal use of gold as a standard of value in international trans-
actions impresses it to a peculiar degree with the quality of money. The power to
maintain the parity of all kinds of United States currency would need only a slight
extension to include this regulation of parity with gold bullion, the basic international
standard." Id. at 678.
i. Loda v. Raines, 193 Ark. 513, 100 S. W. (2d) 973 (1937) ; McKeown v. Arget-
singer, 279 N. W. 402 (Minn. 1938); Tulsa Yellow Cab, etc., Co. v. Salomon, i8r
Okla. 519, 75 P. (2d) 197 (1938); Note (936) io5 A. L. R. 1319, 1330; (0936) 35
MIcH. L. Rxv. 338, 339. Contra: Wilson v. Thurston Co., 82 Mont. 492, 267 Pac. 8o1
(1928).
2. Helton v. Prater's Adm'r, 272 Ky. 574, 114 S. W. (2d) 1120 (1938). What
constitutes good faith is usually said to be within the discretion of the trial court.
Verna v. Moffatt, 15 N. E. (2d) 62 (Ill. App. 1938) ; Bell v. Denny Roll & Panel Co.,
21o N. C. 813, 188 S. E. 62I (x936) ; Salerno v. Oppmann, 52 Ohio App. 416, 3 N. E.
(2d) 8oi (1936) ; (I935) 9 U. oF Ci?. L. REV. 200, 203. It will be noted, however,
that appellate courts have frequently held that it is reversible error for the trial judge
to refuse to permit such a line of questioning. Atlantic Coach Co. v. Cobb, 178 Ga.
544, 174 S. E. 131 (934) ; Nordyke v. Pastrell, 54 Nev. 98, 7 P. (2d) 598 (1932).
Contra: Hoagland v. Chestnut Farms Dairy, 72 F. (2d) 729 (App. D. C. 1934);
Jones v. Smithson, 193 S. E. 802 (W. Va. 1937).
3. See Vega v. Evans, 128 Ohio St. 535, 541, 191 N. E. 757, 759.
4. In the instant case at 507, the dissent suggests that such an impression is some-
times conveyed to the jury when defendant has only a limited coverage. This may also
occur when one of two joined defendants does not carry insurance. See Smith v. Star
Cab Co., 323 Mo. 441, 446, ig S. W. (2d) 467, 469 (1929). Since evidence of lack of
insurance or of limited coverage is inadmissible, the defendant in such cases is helpless
to dispel the false impression. Clayton v. Wells, 324 Mo. 1176, 26 S. W. (2d) 969
(I93O). For a discussion of this subject see Nilles, The Right to Interrogate Jurors
with Reference to Insurance in Negligence Cases (1931) 3 D~Ax. L. REv. 4o6, 4o9.
5. See Holman v. Cole, 242 Mich. 402, 404, 218 N. W. 795, 796 (1928) (judicial
notice taken of jury's prejudice).
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the difficulty of detecting bad faith,6 but it appears that the slight risk of
having on the jury a person or persons financially interested in defendant's
insurer is outweighed by the virtual certainty of prejudicing the jury if
this type of questioning is permitted.7 The attempt of a few courts to
discover an equitable solution to the problem, although resulting in some
confusion,8 has opened the way to a more satisfactory procedure. The
dissent in the instant case, suggesting that plaintiff's counsel adopt a cir-
cuitous method of interrogation which avoids the intimation that defendant
is insured,9 presents a solution that has been frequently proposed '0 but
never established as a mandatory rule. 1 It has also been suggested that
the trial court on the first day of its term require the entire panel of jurors
to answer a questionnaire concerning their interests in insurance com-
panies, and make this information available to counsel in all accident cases.'
2
Another proposal is that the trial judge should conduct the inquiry, using
the method of approach advocated in the dissent in the instant case 18 or
some other cautious line of inquiry which will avoid prejudicing the jury?
It is unfortunate that the majority opinion failed to even suggest that some
such method of procedure be adopted in the trial courts.35
Labor Law-Definition of "Labor Dispute" under Pennsylvania
Anti-Injunction Act-The Atlantic Refining Co. refused to insert in
a construction contract a clause requiring the work to be done only by union
labor as requested by the Building and Construction Trades Council.
Thereupon, the Council instituted various actions including picketing the
Refining Co.' and boycotting its goods by having a Teamsters' Union
6. See Note (1933) 17 MiNN. L. REv. 299, 31o. Actually good faith is not the
crux of the matter. As was stated in Adams v. Cline Ice Cream Co., OI W. Va. 35,
38, 131 S. E. 867, 868 (1926), ". . . if the statement prejudices a jury, the prejudice
works its bane, no matter what motive actuates it. The real test is the effect on the
jury."
7. See Bergendahl v. Rabeler, 131 Neb. 538, 543, 268 N. W. 459, 461 (1936).
8. The Ohio Supreme Court altered its position twice within appro.dmately a year
and a half. For a review of these decisions see Note (1936) 10 U. OF CIN. L. REv. 315.
9. The dissent agreed with the rule of law laid down by the majority, but stated
that counsel was not acting in good faith unless he adopted a cautious approach. It
suggested that counsel could ask the juror if he was financially interested in any cor-
poration. If the reply was in the affirmative, he could then ask the type of corporations
juror had an interest in, and proceed with this method of inquiry until the required
information was obtained. Instant case at 5o7.
io. See Prescott v. Swanson, 197 Minn. 325, 338, 267 N. W. 251, 258 (1936);
Safeway Cab Service Co. v. Minor, i8o Okla. 448, 449, 70 P. (2d) 76, 78 (1937).
ii. Note particularly Santee v. Haggart Construction Co., 278 N. W. 520, 521
(Minn. 1938), where the court held that the proper method of procedure outlined in
Prescott v. Swanson, 197 Minn. 325, 338, 267 N. W. 25r, 258 (1936) was not intended
as an ironclad rule, but was merely a suggestion which trial judges could adopt if they
desired.
12. See dissent in Pavilonis v. Valentine, 12o Ohio St. 154, 171, 165 N. E. 730, 735
(1929) ; Nilles, mipra note 4, at 413; Note (936) iO U. oF CiN. L. REV. 315, 319. This
procedure, which was adopted in one of the federal trial courts, was approved in City
Ice & Fuel Co. v. Dankmer, 52 F. (2d) 929, 930 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
13. A Virginia trial court adopted this solution, and the procedure was approved
in Walker v. Crosen, 168 Va. 410, 19 S. E. 753 (1937).
14. See Harker v. Bushouse, 254 Mich. 187, 192, 236 N. W. 222, 224 (1931).
i5. Ample precedent could have been found in Mithen v. Jeffery, 259 Ill. 372, 376,
1o2 N. E. 778, 779 (1913).
i. This comes within the definition of peaceful picketing inasmuch as it was re-
stricted to the distribution of cards and stickers, stating "Atlantic Refining Co. Unfair
to Organized Labor. Do Not Patronize."
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threaten to call a strike in its customers' businesses. Several customers
complied and the Refining Co. sought to enjoin the activities of both unions.
Held, that the injunction must be denied since there is a "labor dispute"
within the meaning of the Labor Anti-Injunction Act.2 Atlantic Refining
Co. v. Cohen, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 19, 1938, p. i, col. 6 (Pa.
C. P. 1938).
The power of the court to issue an injunction in the instant case is
to be determined largely by the much litigated question of whether or not
a "labor dispute" within the meaning of the Act exists.8 The solution
necessarily involves a consideration of the disputants and the nature of the
dispute.4 The Act requires that the disputants be ". . . persons who are
engaged in a single industry . . . or have direct or indirect interests
therein. .... " and that the dispute be ". .. a controversy concerning
terms or conditions of employment . . . or any other controversy arising
out of the respective interests of employer and employe, regardless of
whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer
and employe . . .,,." The U. S. Supreme Court 7 and the majority of
state courts 8 have given full effect to these clauses but there has been a
recent tendency on the part of the New York courts to construe their
statute more strictly especially in cases involving secondary boycotts and
other indirect coercive measures. 9 Since the secondary boycott was unques-
tionably enjoinable at common law,10 it is natural that courts be reluctant
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 43, § 2o6. For a collection of stat-
utes similar to the Pa. Act, see Note (1937) 16 N. C. L. REv. 38. The New Jersey Act
was recently declared unconstitutional but sustained as a declaration that certain acts
are not tortious. Eastwood-Nealley Corp. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, i
A. (:2d) 477 (N. J. Ch. 1938).
3. For a very complete analysis of this problem including a collection of all cases
prior to 1938, see Notes (937) 35 Mica. L. Rev. 1320, (1938) 36 MICH. L. Rev.
1146; 1938 cases are cited infra note 9. See also Donnelly Garment Co. International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, 6 U. S. L. WEEK 306 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938).
4. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 43, §2o6c.
5. Id. at §2o6c (a) (b).
6. Id. at § 2o6c (c). This was expressly inserted in the Act to avoid the restrictions
of Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U. S. 443 (1921).
7. Lauf v. Shinner, 303 U. S. 323, New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co.,
303 U. S. 552 (1938), 86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 784.
8. Notes (1937) 35 Micii. L. REV. 1320, 1328, (1938) 36 Mic~. L. REv. 1146.
9. John F. Trommer v. Brotherhood of Brewery Workers, 167 Misc. 197, 3 N. Y.
S. (2d) 782 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (no "labor dispute" when it is merely an intra-union dis-
agreement and misleading picketing enjoined) ; Weil & Co. v. Doe, 168 Misc. 211, 5
N. Y. S. (2d) 559 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (no "labor dispute" where Metal Workers Union
picketed furniture store which had purchased a sign allegedly not made by union labor.
to validate a secondary boycott, there must be a unity of interest between the
picket and the picketed. A remote connection is not enough." Id. at 561) ; Associated
Flour Haulers v. Sullivan, 168 Misc. 315, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 982 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (no
"labor dispute" when Longshoremen's Union's demands that existing contract between
hauler and Teamsters' Union should be changed resulting in a strike. This case might
better have been decided on the ground that there was a "labor dispute" which could be
enjoined because of a provision peculiar to the New York statute, which allows injunc-
tion when a breach of contract is involved. See Greater City Master Plumbers Ass'n
v. KIrahme, 6 N. Y. S. [2d] 589 [Sup. Ct. 1937], where this view was taken) ; Bieber
v. Binenbaum, 167 Misc. 296, 6 N. Y. S. (2d) 63 (Sup. Ct. r938) (no "labor dispute"
where union picketed for increased wages for employer's one employee. Peaceful pick-
eting was allowed); Pitter v. Kaminsky, 7 N. Y. S. (2d) IO (Sup. Ct. 1938) (no
"labor dispute" where union picketed owner of business employing no outside help to
induce him to hire employees).
1O. Hellerstein, Secondary Boycotts in Labor Disputes (1938) 47 YALE L. J. 341;
(1938) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 547; 5 U. oF CHi. L. REV. 518. See also Duplex v. Deer-
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to accept the restrictive effects of the statute in cases similar to the instant
case where the plaintiff has no more than a contractual relation with the
employer, the defendants are unions only indirectly connected with the
plaintiff's business, and the harm done is appreciable. However, these New
York decisions are to be explained mainly by the somewhat narrower terms
of the New York statute.1 1 Under the broad provisions of the Pennsylva-
nia Act, the remoteness of the connection between the disputants would seem
to make little difference as to the question of whether the Act must be ap-
plied.
Procedure-Privilege of a Party Defendant Under a Writ of Scire
Facias to Join a Party Plaintiff as an Additional Defendant-Under
the authority of a statute,1 the owner and the operator of an automobile
involved in a collision with another vehicle joined in an action to recover
for property and personal injuries respectively. The defendants, the owner
and the operator of the other automobile, under the authority of the Penn-
sylvania Sci. Fa. Act,2 issued a writ joining the plaintiff driver as an
additional defendant. The plaintiff driver filed an affidavit of defense to
the writ, alleging that because he was a party to the action, the writ was
improperly issued against him. Held, that the affidavit of defense should be
dismissed because the "defendant may join with him as an additional de-
fendant one plaintiff, who, he alleges, is alone liable to another plaintiff for
the cause of action declared on by the first plaintiff." Gannon et al. v.
Savar et al., Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 6, 1938, p. I, col. 3 (Pa. C. P.
1938).
The history of third party practice in Pennsylvania consists of a series
of judicial decrees limiting the practice and legislative enactments broaden-
ing it, the latter usually having the purpose of correcting the former.3
Chiefly because of the perseverance of the legislature, there exists in Penn-
sylvania a provision for third party practice which is perhaps more liberal
than that of any other jurisdiction.4 Even so, every obstacle in the way of
a completely effective third party practice and the achievement of that im-
portant aim of the practice, the avoidance of multiplicity of suits,5 has not
ing, 254 U. S. 443, 466 (192o) ; Wilson & Adams Co. v. Pearce, 24o App. Div. 718, 178
N. Y. Supp. 713 (2d Dep't, 1933), af'd, 264 N. Y. 521, 197 N. E. 545 (934); Cote v.
Murphy, 159 Pa. 420, 28 Ati. ig (1894).
ii. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. (Cahill, Supp. 1936) § 876a. "A case shall be held to involve
a labor dispute when the case involves persons who are engaged in the same
industry, trade, craft, or occupation. . . ." Id. at § 876a (io) (a). It is immaterial
" ... whether or not the disputants stand in the relation of employer and employee."
Id. at § 876a (io) (c).
The Wisconsin statute expressly provides that an injunction may issue in cases of
secondary boycott. WIS. STAT. 1931, 268.20 (I) (f). See (1938) U. or PA. L. Rxv.
547, 549.
I. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 12, § 159.1.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 12, § 141.
3. See Lehman, Addition of Defendants by the Pennsylvania Sci. Fa. Acts of 1929
and 193I (1933) 37 DICK. L. REv. 234, 253, 254, 255; I MooRE AND FRIEDMAN, Moo 'S
FED)ERAL PRAcTiCE (1938) Part II, Ch. 14, § 14.05, pp. 765, 766; (1938) 13 TEMP. L.
Q. 141.
4. I MOORE AND FRIEDMAN, 10C. cit. supra note 3; Bennett, Bringing in Third Par-
ties by the Defendant (935) 19 MINN. L. REv. 163, 188.
5. See Vinnacombe v. Philadelphia et al., 297 Pa. 564, 569, 147 At. 826, 827
(1929) ; Gossard v. Gossard et al., 319 Pa. 129, 133, 178 Atl. 837, 838 (1935) ; Ma-
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been removed. One such obstacle lies in the supreme court's interpreta-
tion of the Sci. Fa. Act in the cases of Shapiro v. Philadelphia et al.' and
Jones v. Wohigernuth 7 as giving the defendant no privilege to have the
writ issued against a plaintiff in the action." With this interpretation of
the Act the decision in the instant case is in direct conflict. However, at
the time of the Shapiro and Wohlgemuth decisions the gratuitous restric-
tion 9 which the court was placing upon the defendant's access to the benefit
of the sci. fa. could not have appeared to be serious, since joinder of per-
sons as plaintiffs in the action then was subject to the severe limitations
of the common law.10  But since that time parties have, by statute," been
given the privilege to join as plaintiffs wherever they have "a right of action,
whether jointly, severally or in the alternative, in respect of, or arising
from, the same transaction or series of transactions" and where their actions
"give rise to any common question of law or fact. . . ." It is patent that
where parties join under the broad provisions of this act, the defendant,
if he is prevented access to all who join as plaintiffs, will be substantially
limited in his privileges under the Sci. Fa. Act. In view of this intervening
change of circumstances, the instant court was probably justified in refus-
ing to follow strictly the prior supreme court authority. It is now a ques-
tion for speculation whether the supreme court will repudiate its earlier
interpretation of the Act, or whether the legislature will be required to
intervene again to amend that interpretation out of existence.'
2
States-Right of Taxpayer to Enforce Obligation Inuring to
State-On refusal of the state authorities to act, taxpayer brought
suit in equity, for benefit of the state, to recover from sureties on the offi-
cial bond of the state treasurer the amount paid out under an unconstitu-
jewski et al. v. Lempka et al., 321 Pa. 369, 374, 183 Atl. 777, 779 (1936). For a dis-
cussion of the reasons in back of third party practice generally see the opinion of Judge
Addison Brown in The Hudson, 15 Fed. 162 (S. D. N. Y. 1883), which was the begin-
ning of the practice in Admiralty.
6. 306 Pa. 216, 159 Atl. 29 (1932).
7. 313 Pa. 388, 169 At. 758 (1934).
8. Neither the Shapiro case nor the Jones case was a direct holding to this effect.
The exact decision of the Shapiro case was that one already a defendant in the action
could not be brought in as an additional defendant. However, the language of the
court-"The manifest purpose of the act is to enable the defendants . . . to bring
upon the record as 'additional defendants' those not already there . . ."-covers the
situation of the instant case. In the Jones case the parties sought to be joined as addi-
tional defendants were already on the record as plaintiffs, but the court used this merely
as an additional reason for holding the writ improperly issued, first determining that
the cause of action against the additional defendants was not that declared on by the
plaintiffs within the then wording of the Act.
9. The exact wording of the Act is, "Any defendant named in any action, may sue
out . . . a write of scire facias to bring upon the record, as an additional defendant,
any other person. . . ." Had it been the purpose of the legislature to restrict the
scope of the writ to those not already on the record it could easily have done so by the
inclusion of the words, "not already a party to the action" after the phrase "any other
person". It is a fair assumption that it was not intended so to restrict the use of the
writ, because the words "not a party to the action" appear in the English third party
practice act, The Annual Practice, 1924, Order XVI, rules 48-55, pp. 281 et seq., which
must have been brought to the attention of the legislature.
Io. I JoHNSON, PRACTICE IN PENNSYLVANIA (1910) Ch. XXIV, § 17, and cases
there cited.
II. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 12, § 159.1.
12. For the future, it will be interesting to observe how the difficulties of this situ-
ation will be treated in the new rules of civil procedure now in process of promulgation
by the supreme court committee under the authority of an act of the legislature. PA.
STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 17, § 61 et seq.
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tional act granting legislators a personal expense allowance. Complainant
argued that the suit could be maintained on the strength of the rule allow-
ing taxpayers' suits to recover municipal funds under similar circumstances.
In denying recovery the court held that the principles governing the rela-
tion of taxpayer to municipality are not applicable to his relation to the
state, to the extent of suing for the recovery of misapplied funds.1 Powers
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. et al., 182 So. 758 (Ala. 1938).
In general, a taxpayer cannot maintain a suit for the use of the state
to enforce a claim or demand inuring to the state itself.2 However, several
jurisdictions make an exception to this rule and allow taxpayers' suits in
equity to compel repayment to the treasury of state funds unlawfully ex-
pended, where it appears that the proper officer has refused to act.8 These
decisions depend, primarily, on an extension of the rule allowing taxpayers'
suits involving municipal funds,4 which in turn derive their effectiveness
from the analogous situation of shareholder and private corporation.$ While
the instant court follows the weight of authority 6 in recognizing the so-
called municipal analogy to the extent of allowing taxpayers to restrain
state officers from illegal expenditures, 7 it deems further extension to suits
for recovery of funds already misapplied, to be unwarranted. The difficulty,
as noted in the instant case, is that the requirement of joining the corpora-
tion or municipality as party defendants applies as well to the state, which
cannot be sued without its consent. This objection has been disregarded by
a few courts in their desire to afford citizens and taxpayers protection
against unlawful expenditures which would ultimately result in increased
taxation to replenish the state funds.9 It would seem that these latter
courts take the more realistic view of the situation; for the rationale of
I. In reaching its decision, the court also concluded that complainant did not have
the requisite interest, under a statute dealing with the legal effect of official bond, to
maintain suit in his own name on such bond. Instant case at 759. It is generally
accepted that an action by, or in behalf of, a private individual cannot be maintained
on the bond of an officer given solely for the protection and benefit of the public, in the
absence of legislation expressly conferring this right Alexander v. Ison, io7 Ga. 745,
33 S. E. 657 (899).
2. Mitchell v. Stephens, 285 Fed. 756 (S. D. Cal. 1922); Schneider v. Yellott, 124
Md. 92, 9I Atl. 779 (1914).
3. Wertz v. Shane, 216 Iowa 768, 249 N. W. 661 (1933); Malone v. Peay, 157
Tenn. 429, 7 S. W. (2d) 40 (1928). But cf. Sears v. James, 47 Ore. 5o, 82 Pac. 14
(195o) (in which there appeared no evidence that the proper officer refused to act).
4. 6 McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2d ed. rev. 1936) § 2747; 4 DILLON,
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5th ed. 19I1) §§ 1579, 1588. See Note (1933) 33 Co. L.
REV. 1014; (1935) 13 N. C. L. REV. 248.
5. 4 DILLON, op. cit. supra note 4, § i58o; STEVENS, CORPORATIONS (936) § 163.
6. Fergus v. Russel, 27o Ill. 3o4, 11O N. E. 130 (I915); Conway v. New Hamp-
shire Water Resources Board, i99 Atl. 83 (N. H. 1938) ; State ex rel. Jensen v. Kelly,
65 S. D. 345, 274 N. W. 319 (937); Page v. King, 285 Pa. 153, 13x Atl. 707 (1926),
in which the court, without discussion as to possible distinctions, followed Frame v.
Felix, 167 Pa. 47, 31 Atl. 375 (i895) allowing taxpayer to restrain illegal expenditure
by municipal officers. Contra: Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447 (1923);
Asplund v. Hannett, 31 N. M. 641, 249 Pac. io74 (1926). These cases seriously con-
test the majority view, both on public policy, and because, while taxpayer's interest in
city funds may be direct and proximate, his interest in state funds is too minute to sus-
tain equity jurisdiction. See Note (1936) 16 B. U. L. REV. 982.
7. Turnipseed v. Blan, 226 Ala. 549, 148 So. II6 (i933); Hall v. Blan, 227 Ala.
64, 148 So. 6ox (1933) ; see instant case at 76o.
8. Davenport v. Dows, 85 U. S. 626 (1873) ; Shepard v. Easterling, 6i Neb. 882,
86 N. W. 941 (go) ; 4 DIL.ON, op. cit. mipra note 4, § 1588; STEVENS, CORPORATIONS
(1936) § i65.
9. Wertz v. Shane, 216 Iowa 768, 249 N. W. 661 (i933); Malone v. Peay, 157
Tenn. 429, 7 S. W. (2d) 40 (1928). See 4 DIL.On, op. cit. supra note 4, § 580; 4
COOLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 1657, for suggestion of this practical reason.
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the joinder rule, to insure the flow of benefits to the corporation or state,10
seems to suggest that, although a nominal defendant, the corporation or
state is in reality a plaintiff. 1' The instant decision, based on the mere
form of the suit, deprives the taxpayer of a remedy for a claim which might
be valid in substance. For while the validity of legislative appropriations
may be tested by suit for injunction, there seems to be no adequate remedy
after the misapplication of funds has occurred, unless through writ of man-
damus compelling the proper officer to take the necessary steps for the
recovery of such funds. But the applicability of this form of remedy is con-
jectural, at best.'
2
Taxation-Personal Property Tax to Trustees for Intangibles
Held in Trust-A New Jersey domiciliary set up a trust by will pro-
bated in New Jersey, the corpus of which is composed entirely of securities
which are kept in the possession of the New Jersey trustee. All of the
trust affairs are conducted in New Jersey.' Three of the four trustees live
in Pennsylvania. Held, that the trustees living in Pennsylvania must pay
the state personal property tax,2 on the value of three-quarters of the trust
fund, because they are the legal owners and the maxim mobilia sequuntur
personam 3 applies. In re Personal Property Tax Assessed against the
Trustees of the Dorrance Estate, Phila. Legal Intelligencer, Oct. 13, 1938
p. i, col. 2 (Pa. C. P. 1938).
The court adopts the settled rule that intangibles held in trust are
taxable to the trustees at their domicile, 4 subject to apportionment if the
10. STEVENS, COR'ORATIONS (1936) § 165 (in which there is suggested the further
reason that the action should be res judicata).
ii. Goldberg v. Emanuel, i66 Misc. 6IO, 2 N. Y. Supp. (2d) 943 (Sup. Ct. I938),
86 U. OF PA. L. REv. 673 (i938), rev'd, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 946 (ist Dep't, 1938). See
Finch, J., dissenting in Freeman v. Bean, 243 App. Div. 503, 5o4, 276 N. Y. Supp. 310,
311 (ist Dep't, 1934). However, see instant case at 76o, in which it is said that only
those authorized by the legislature may use the name of the state to enforce an obliga-
tion due the state itself.
12. In general, mandamus will lie to compel the performance of duties purely min-
isterial in their nature, but will not lie as to any acts or duties necessarily calling for
the exercise of judgment or discretion by the officer in charge. HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY
LEGAL REmEaiEs (3d ed. 1896) § 24. See 2 BAILEY, HnEns CoRius (1913) §:229, in
which it is said that mandamus will not ordinarily lie against the attorney general for
such purpose, since he is invested with a large discretion in the matter of instituting
proceedings in behalf of the state. However, in FERRS, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REm-
EDIES (1926) § 209, the view allowing mandamus to review an arbitrary and unreason-
able exercise of discretion is advanced.
I. The New Jersey trustee, a corporation, by its charter cannot act in Pennsyl-
vania. The trustees maintain an office in New Jersey expressly for the trust, at which
all trust affairs are transacted. Since the principal asset of the trust is all the common
shares of the Campbell Soup Co., the trustees are principally engaged in managing the
company in New Jersey. All trust records are kept in New Jersey.
2. PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, Supp. 1937) tit. 72, § 3244.
3. 2 CooLEY, TAXATION (4th ed. 1924) § 440.
4. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 280 U. S. 83 (1929); Mackay v. San
Francisco, 128 Cal. 578, 6i Pac. 382 (I9OO) ; Guthrie v. Pittsburgh C. and St. Louis
PL, i58 Pa. 433, 27 Atl. 1052 (1893) ; cf. Goodsite v. Lane, 139 Fed. 592 (C. C. A. 6th,
1905) ; cases collected (193o) 67 A. L. R. 393; 2 COOLEY, TAXATION § 469; Brown, The
Taxation of Trust Property (935) 23 Ky. L. J. 403. Contra: Newcomb v. Paige, 224
Mass. 516, 113 N. E. 458 (1916).
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trustees live in different taxing jurisdictions.5 By inference the court indi-
cates that if these securities had a "business situs" 6 in New Jersey, the
maxim mobilia sequuntur personam would not apply, and the trust would
be taxable only in New Jersey. But this point has not yet been clearly
settled by the United States Supreme Court. Despite its language in cer-
tain opinions condemning multiple taxation of intangibles, 7 the most recent
decisions indicate that the court is not adverse to this result. In First Bank
Stock Corp. v. Minnesotas for example, a property tax by Minnesota on
plaintiff's shares in North Dakota and Montana banks was approved
although such shares were taxed at the corporate domiciles. Again in
Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsylvania 9 the shares of a domestic corporation
were permitted to be taxed regardless of whether they were also taxed in
the hands of nonresident owners. Furthermore, under the recently decided
case of Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia,0 the* income from the trust ap-
parently would be taxable both to the trustees and the beneficiaries. Since
these cases sanction multi-state taxation of intangibles in certain instances,
it can be argued in the instant case that the establishment of a business
situs for the securities in New Jersey would not necessarily preclude taxa-
tion by Pennsylvania."" However, assuming the instant court's interpre-
tation of the law, a question arises whether these securities have a business
situs outside Pennsylvania. On the analogy to Bristol v. Washington
County,"2 where a series of debts was held to have acquired a business
situs in the state where an agent managed them, the instant court might
well have held that a business situs of the trust had been established in
New Jersey.'3 But since it is difficult to see what more the trustees could
have done to establish such a situs,14 the effect of the instant holding on
its facts apparently is that no business situs can be established for intangibles
held in trust. There is little clear authority contrary to this result '5 and
at least one commentator 16 has suggested that the situs theory should not
be applied to trusts because of the difficulty in determining the place where
the trust is to be administered.
5. Mackay v. San Francisco, 128 Cal. 578, 61'Pac. 382 (1900) ; 2 COOLEY, TAXA-
TION § 470.
6. See 2 COOLEY, TAXATION § 465.
7. See Safe Deposit and Trust Co. v. Virginia, 28o U. S. 83, 94 (1929) ; Farmers'
Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 212 (193o) ; First National Bank v.
Maine, 284 U. S. 312, 322 (1932) ; Senior v. Braden, 295 U. S. 422, 432 (1935) ; Wheel-
ing Steel Corp. v. Fox, 298 U. S. 193, 209 (1936).
8. 30, U. S. 234 (1937) ; Cream of Wheat Co. v. Grand Forks County, 253 U. S.
325 (1920).
9. 3o2 U. S. 5o6 (1938). Possibly this case is distinguishable on the grounds sug-
gested by Hawley v. Malden, 232 U. S. I (1914).
io. 6 U. S. L. WEEK 265 (U. S. 1938), aff'g, Ryan v. Commonwealth, 169 Va.
414, x93 S. E. 534 (I937), 86 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 555 (1938).
II. 2 COOLEY, TAXATION § 467.
12. 177 U. S. 133 (9oo).
i3. But that no rigid test exists, see Smith v. Ajax Pipe Line Co., 87 F. (2d) 567
(C. C. A. 8th, 1937) ; 2 COOLEY, TAXATION § 466.
14. See supra note I.
15. Hawk, Ex'r v. Bonn, 6 Ohio C. C. 452 (1892) ; Newcomb v. Paige, 224 Mass.
516, 113 N. E. 458 (1916); Hutchins v. Commissioner, 272 Mass. 422, 172 N. E. 605
(193o) ; Thorne v. State, 145 Minn. 412, 177 N. W. 412 (192o) ; State v. Phelps, 172
Wis. I47, 176 N. W. 863 (1920) ; Beale, The Progress of the Law, z99-i92o (1920)
34 HARv. L. REv. 50.
16. Brown, supra note 4, at 409.
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Taxation-Sales Taxes-Vendor as Agent or Taxpayer-Plain-
tiff supplied ice to the defendant under a contract in which the price was
fixed. Subsequently the state passed the "Retail Sales Tax of 1933" '
which imposed a tax "upon retailers" 2 for the privilege of selling at retail.
Under a section of the act which provided that the vendor might add the
tax to existing contracts and collect it from the consumer,3 plaintiff sued
to recover the amount of the tax on the ice delivered. Held, that since the
statute made the retailer, and not the purchaser, the taxpayer, plaintiff
retailer may not force another to pay his tax, and the section so providing
was a denial of due process. National Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Pacific
Fruit Express Co., 79 P. (2d) 380 (Cal. 1938).
Plaintiff, a gasoline dealer, paid under protest a local sales tax which
he had collected from purchasers. The tax was later declared invalid and
plaintiff sued for a refund df the tax. Held, that the plaintiff was merely
the agent of the state and therefore could not recover for the purchaser who
was the taxpayer under the statute. Kesbec v. McGoldrick, 16 N. E., (2d)
288 (N. Y. Ct. of App. 1938).
In drafting sales taxes, legislatures are faced with a unique problem.
It is almost universally intended that the burden of the tax shall rest on
the consumer as a primary liability.4 But it is a practical impossibility for
the state to collect directly from the purchaser. Consequently it must be
collected from the vendor. This is sometimes accomplished by calling the
vendor a "taxpayer" ' and sometimes by calling him a "collector".6 Merely
making him a "collector", however, does not assure the full payment of
the tax to the state because of the difficulty of collection in many cases 7
and the questionable zeal of the vendor. Consequently, full responsibility
is imposed on him for the amount of the tax whether he collects it or not.8
This responsibility is construed to be that of a "taxpayer" even in the
absence of the term from the statute,9 and the constitutionality of thus
making the retailer pay the consumer's tax was upheld in Pierce Oil Co. v.
i. CAL. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1933) act 8493.
2. Id. §3.
3. Id. §4.
4. This is shown by provisions forbidding the retailer to advertise that the tax will
be assumed or absorbed by him: Aax. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) c. 158, § 14084; CAL.
CiV. CODE (Deering, 1933) act 8493, § 8; Colo. Laws 1935, c. 189, § 5d; N. C. CODE
(Michie, 1935) § 788o (I56) b; allowing the retailer to add the tax to the selling price
and collect it from the consumer: CA.. Civ. CODE (Deering, 1933) act 8493 § 82;
Colo. Laws 1935, c. 189, § 5b; N. C. CODE (Michie, 1935) § 7880 (I56)b; and allowing
the retailer to postpone payment of the tax on credit sales until he has collected from
the purchaser: Alum. DIo. STAT. (Pope, 1937) c. 158, § 14071; CAL. CirV. CODE (Deer-
ing, 1933) act 8493, § 9; NEw MEX. STAT. (Courtright, 1938) § 141, 1707 (a).
5. N. C. CODE (Michie, 1935) § 7880 (I56)b; NEv MEx. STAT. (Courtright, 1938)
§ 141, 1701-50.
6. ARx. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) c. 158, § 14075; N. Y. Local Laws 1934, No. 25,
p. 164; Utah Laws 1933, c. 63, § 5.
7. This is especially so where the tax amounts to less than one cent. See W. F.
Jensen Candy Co. v. State Tax Comm., 90 Utah 359, 61 P. (2d) 629 (r936).
8. ARK. DIG. STAT. (Pope, 1937) c. 158, § 14077; Colo. Laws 1935, c. 189, § 5a;
N. C. CODE (Michie, 1935) §7880 (x56)g; Okla. Laws 1935, c. 196, §6a; Utah Laws
1933, c. 63, § 8.
9. United States v. Johnston, 268 U. S. 22o (1925) ; In re Reimer, 82 F. (2d) 162
(C. C. A. 2d, 1936) ; Builders' Club of Chicago v. United States, 14 F. Supp. io2o (Ct.
Cl. 1936) ; Matter of Atlas Television Co., 273 N. Y. 5I, 6 N. E. (2d) 94 (1936) ; In
re Rockaway, 249 App. Div. 66, 291 N. Y. Supp. 341 (2d Dep't, 1936); Gibson Co.
Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., i8o Okla. 53, 68 P. (2d) 87 (1937).
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Hopkins. ° Accordingly, the use of the epithet adds nothing to the vendor's
liability and subtracts nothing from the consumer's ultimate burden. How-
ever, the apparent inability of some courts to conceive of a situation where
there are in effect two taxpayers of a single tax has led to curious results.
Thus, the California court, looking at the wording of the statute, deter-
mined that the vendor was the "taxpayer", 1 and the connotation of that
word excluded the idea of the consumer's liability. However, if the court
had merely interpreted the word "taxpayer" to mean "collector" or "agent"
with full responsibility as in other states, apparently the statute would have
been unobjectionable. Since the court admitted that the substance of the
statute was perfectly constitutional, it appears indefensible to allow statu-
tory phraseology to obscure the substance and defeat the intention of the
legislature."2
The New York court, on the other hand, concluded that the vendor
was merely the agent of the city 18 in collecting the tax and therefore could
not recover the refund as a taxpayer. The problem in this situation, how-
ever, is not what to call the vendor but how to get the amount collected
under the invalid tax back into the hands of the consumer. In denying
the refund the court might have been influenced by the extreme caution
of the federal courts ' 4 in applying the Revenue Act of 1936 which restricted
10. 264 U. S. 137 (1924). The theory is ". . . that the seller is directed to
collect the tax from the purchaser when he makes the sale, and that a State which has,
under its constitution, power to regulate the business of selling gasoline (and doubt-
less, also, the power to tax the privilege of carrying on that business) is not prevented
by the due process clause from imposing the incidental burden." Id. at 139. See also
Johnson v. Diefendorf, 56 Idaho 62o, 57 P. (2d) io68 (1936) ; Blauner's, Inc. v. Phila-
delphia, 330 Pa. 342, 198 Atl. 889 (1938).
ii. Cf. People v. Herbert's of Los Angeles, Inc., 3 Cal. App. (2d) 482, 39 P. (2d)
829 (1935) ; Roth Drug, Inc. v. Johnson, 13 Cal. App. (2d) 720, 57 P. (2d) 1O22
(1936).
12. See the words of Chief Justice Hughes in Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286
U. S. 472, 476 (1932), which, though spoken in a different connection, are very perti-
nent to this situation: "In maintaining rights asserted under the Federal Constitution,
the decision of this Court is not dependent upon the form of a taxing scheme, or upon
the characterization of it by the state court. We regard the substance rather than the
form, and the controlling test is found in the operation and effect of the statute as
applied and enforced by the state." See also Stedman v. Winston-Salem, 2o4 N. C.
203, 205, 167 S. E. 813, 815 (1933) : "The judicial denomination of a tax as an excise
tax or a property tax is a mere use of terms and the selection of certain letters from
the alphabet. The ultimate test is the operation of the tax and its practical applica-
tion to the commercial transactions of life." (Italics supplied.)
13. Kerber Straw Hat Corp. v. Lincoln, 239 App. Div. 727, 268 N. Y. Supp. 745
(ist Dep't, 1934). The Appellate Division held that a fiduciary relationship existed
between the buyer and seller for the return of the refunded import duty. See Field,
Recovery of Illegal and Unconstitutional Taxes (1932) 45 HARv. L. REv. 5O at 516, to
the effect that in New York the taxpayer has been allowed recovery where he could
be treated as the agent of the customer. There is considerable difference of opinion
throughout the country on the agency point. In Tite v. The State Tax Comm., 89 Utah
404, 57 P. (2d) 737 (1936) and in Breaux Ballard v. Shannon, 271 Ky. 553, 112 S. W.
(2d) 996 (1938), the distributor is regarded as the agent of the state, and therefore
should not be able to recover. Cf. Benoline Co. v. State, 122 Ohio St. 175, 171 N. E.
33 (193o) ; Commonwealth v. Kaplan, 311 Pa. 539, 166 At. 833 (1933). But note that
an Oklahoma statute making the distributor the agent of the state for the collection of
the gasoline tax was interpreted by the courts to mean that the distributor stands in the
same relation to the state as an ordinary taxpayer. 2 01aA. STAT. i046 (1931) ; Gib-
son v. Oklahoma Tax Comm., 18o Okla. 53, 68 P. (2d) 87 (I937). It has also been
argued that there can be no agency for the collection of an illegal tax. See Kesbec Inc.
v. Taylor, 253 App. Div. 353, 355, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 241, 243 (1st Dep't, 1938).
14. Anniston Mfg. Co. v. Davis, 3oi U. S. 337 (1937); Stone v. White, 3o U. S.
532 (1937) ; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Harrison, 18 F. Supp. 250 (N. D. Ill. 1937). In
these processing tax cases, in order to get a refund the processor must show that he has
borne the burden of the tax, or has unconditionally repaid the vendee who did.
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the refunding policy of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.15 Naturally the
courts should not permit the refund to be a windfall for the vendor, but
rather than leaving the matter to be settled by a multitude of small claims
by each individual consumer, other courts have worked out schemes to ac-
complish the result in a more practical manner and have given effect to
statutes drafted for this purpose. The Automobile Accessories Tax of
1928,16 for example, allowed the vendor to recover for the consumer where
the latter had borne the burden, but the vendor was required to file a bond
in an amount equal to one-and-one-half times the sum determined to be
refundable, and within six months of the refund the vendor was obliged
to furnish the Commissioner of Internal Revenue with an affidavit from
purchasers as evidence of the receipt of taxes and interest."7 Certain Illinois
cases 18 do not go so far as to require a bond securing the good faith of
the petitioner, but in order to recover in behalf of his customers the vendor
must show a record under which full and accurate payment can be made.
Even less exacting were the New York courts themselves in Wayne County
Produce Co. v. Duffy-Mott. 9  There no bond was required, and no mention
was made of the completeness of the petitioner's records. Although in all
these cases, both in Illinois and New York, there was an agreement -
between the vendor and the consumer that the former should pay the tax
under protest, with the understanding that any refund should accrue to the
latter, such an agreement seems to be important merely as evidence that the
tax was not absorbed in the total price, thereby allowing the buyer to
retain his interest. 21  It is unfortunate, therefore, that the instant court 22
did not work out some similar plan of getting the money back to the'con-
sumer with a minimum of expense and inconvenience.
23
15. 49 STAT. 1747 (1936), 7 U. S. C. A. § 644 et seq. (Supp. 1938).
6. 45 STAT. 866 (1928). Virginia-Carolina Rubber Co. v. United States, 7 F.
Supp. 299 (Ct. Cl. 1934).
17. 30 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 191 (1928).
18. Standard Oil Co. v. Bollinger, 348 Ill. 82, i8o N. E. 396 (1932) ; Benzoline Mo-
tor Fuel Co. v. Bollinger, 353 II. 6oo, 187 N. E. 657 (1933). But see 3 COOLEY, TAXA-
TION (4th ed. 1924) § 1305, to the effect that a suit cannot be maintained by one tax-
payer in behalf of himself and others, but each must sue in his own behalf. Compare
Trustees v. Thoman, 51 Ohio St. 285, 37 N. E. 523 (1894), with Shannon v. Hughes
Co., 270 Ky. 530, 109 S. W. (2d) 1174 (1937). The necessity for complete records of
sales is also stressed in Kesbec, Inc. v. Taylor, 253 App. Div. 353 at 355, 2 N. Y. Supp.
(2d) 241 at 243 (Ist Dep't, 1938).
19. 244 N. Y. 351, 155 N. E. 669 (1927); Christopher v. Hoger Co., i6o N. Y.
Misc. 21, 289 N. Y. Supp. 105 (N. Y. City Ct. 1936).
20. In Planter's Chocolate Co. v. Brown-Murray Co., 128 Pa. Super. 239, 193 Atl.
381 (937), the court denied recovery to the vendor in the absence of a contract or
understanding between himself and the buyer.
21. Lash's Products Co. v. United States, 27F U. S. 175 (1928), where a notifica-
tion sent by the petitioner to his customers before the contract of sale was entered into,
was regarded as evidence that the tax was absorbed in the total price, and therefore
the seller did not sue for refund in behalf of the buyer, but in his own behalf.
22. Spencer v. Consumer's Oil Co., 115 Conn. 554, 162 Atl. 23 (932), cited in the
instant case in support of the holding, is distinguishable in that there the vendor in-
tended to use the unconstitutionality of the act as a means of enriching himself. Fur-
thermore, in the Spencer case the vendor had not paid under protest, and protest is a
prerequisite to recovery.
23. The holding in Kesbec Inc. v. Taylor, 253 App. Div. 353, 2 N. Y. S. (2d)
241 (Ist Dep't, 1938), is more in harmony with the bulk of authority than the decision
reached in the instant case. There the court thought that the vendor should make resti-
tution to the customer either by a credit allowance or by a refund of the amount, or
else be subject to an action for money had and received because any one of these would
be simpler than the procedure provided for in the local ordinance. N. Y. Local Laws
1934, No. 25, p. 164.
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Torts-Liability of Parent's Employer for Death of Child Caused
by Parent's Negligence-A father, while acting in the scope of his
employment, negligently ran over and killed his infant daughter. The
child's administrator brought suit against the father's employer under a
death statute. Held, that the administrator may recover. O'Connor v.
Benson Coal Co., 16 N. E. (2d) 636 (Mass. 1938).1
In Luster v. Luster,2 discussed in a previous issue of the REVIEW,8
the Massachusetts court followed the majority rule in holding that an un-
emancipated minor child could not maintain an action against the parent for
injuries suffered through the latter's negligence. By allowing recovery in
the instant case, the court recognized that the only reason for the rule is
that public policy forbids as far as possible the breaking up of domestic
tranquillity through suits between members of the family. Although the
court leaned rather heavily on the death statute involved 4 which has been
construed as punishment for the defendant's wrongful act rather than as
compensation for the victim's family,5 this decision leaves the way clear for
the court, in future cases, to allow recovery by the injured child itself
against the parent's employer,
6 and the parent's insurance company.
7
Torts-Recovery for Injuries Caused by Worry Over Loss of
Property and Possible Harm to Strangers-Defendant sold plaintiff's
husband, a dairyman, bran which contained arsenic as defendant should
have known. The herd was destroyed and husband died from worry over
loss of business and fear that customers would be poisoned by the milk.
Plaintiff sued for death of husband. Held (two justices dissenting), that
plaintiff should recover. Rasmussen v. Benson, 28o N. W. 890 (Neb.
1938).
This case marks the advance of tort law into uncharted waters. The
original law was that a plaintiff could recover for neither fright nor the
consequences of fright caused by negligence unless he received some con-
i. In a similar case, the Wisconsin court recently allowed an action by a minor's
administrator against his minor brother for death resulting from the latter's negligence.
Both children lived with their parents. This result was reached despite the fact that
the right to recover was based on the liability of defendant to deceased had he survived.
Munsert v. Farmers Insurance Co., 6 U. S. L. WEE 200 (Wis. 1938).
2. 13 N. E. (2d) 438 (Mass. 1938).
3. (938) 86 U. oF PA. L. REv. gog. The case is also discussed in (1938) 7 FoRD.
L. REv. 459.
4. 2 MASs. GEx. LAws (1932) c. 229, § 5.
5. Porter v. Sorell, 280 Mass. 457, 182 N. E. 837 (1932). Where the statute is
construed as compensating the victim's family, the courts have split on whether the
parent, who as next of kin will share in the proceeds of the suit, should profit from his
own wrong. A collection of the cases on this point is presented in the instant case at
page 637. It is submitted that even though the negligent parent is permitted to share
in the damages recovered, he is merely being compensated for the loss sustained by the
death of the child, rather than being benefited by the transaction.
6. Massachusetts has already allowed an action by the wife against the husband's
employer for injuries caused by the husband's negligence. Pittsley v. David, ii N. E.
(2d) 461 (Mass. 1937).
7. Cf. Lusk v. Lusk 113 W. Va. 17, 166 S. E. 538 (1932), 33 CoL. L. REv. 360
(933). The danger of collusion could be minimized by a strict examination of each case
presented.
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temporaneous physical injury from without.' Later majority 2 opinion
allowed recovery for physical harm caused internally by fright when the
negligence complained of had subjected the plaintiff to a threat of physical
violence.3 The next step was allowing recovery for nervous shock induced
by witnessing another's peril, usually the peril of a close relative.4 Now
the extreme is reached in granting relief for illness and death due to worry
over loss of property and possible harm to strangers. 5 The basis for the
decision is that recovery may be had for the physical results of emotional
disturbance. Although this doctrine is too broad to be reconciled with
existing law 6 and the authority cited by the majority,7 there is much to
be said for discarding the special limitations of liability for the results of
mental distress.8 The basis of the action is, after all, the physical injury
and not the mental anguish., But this does not mean that the success of
i. Spade v. Lynn & Boston R. R., 168 Mass. 285, 47 N. E. 88 (1897) ; Mitchell v.
Rochester R. R., I5I N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354, 34 L. R. A. 781 (1896) ; Ewing v. Pitts-
burgh, C. & St. L. Ry., 147 Pa. 4o, 23 Atl. 340 (1892); Victorian Ry. v. Coultas,
(I888) 13 App. Cas. 222. See criticism of this rule in Bohlen, Right to Recover for
Injury Resulting from Negligence without Impact (1902) 41 Am. L. REG. x. s.)
141; Hallen, Damages for Physical Injuries Resulting fron Fright or Shock (I933)
19 VA. L. REV. 253; Throckmorton, Damages for Fright (1921) 34 HARv. L. Rv. 26o.
Injuries from without include injuries sustained in attempting to escape (Tuttle v.
Atlantic City R. R., 66 N. J. L. 327, 49 Atl. 450, 54 L. R. A. 582 [19OI]; Freedman
v. Eastern Mass. R. R., 12 N. E. [2d] 739 [Mass. 1938]), or in fainting (Conley v.
United Drug Co., 218 Mass. 238, 105 N. E. 975 [1914]; Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N.
Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 [1931]). Disregarding the intervening element of fright or
nervousness, recovery is allowed in these cases if the injury was caused by some ex-
ternal, visible, motion which can be attributed to defendant's negligence.
2. See list of jurisdictions and cases in Throckmorton, supra note I, at 265, I. 28.
3. Purcell v. St. Paul City R. R., 48 Minn. 134, 5o N. W. Io34 (1892); Hanford
v. Omaha & C. B. St. Ry., 113 Neb. 423, 2o3 N. W. 643, 4o A. L. R. 970 (1925) ; Netu-
sil v. Novak, 12o Neb. 751, 235 N. W. 335 (i931); Dulien v. White & Sons, (igoi)
2 K. B. 669. For a comprehensive survey of the cases, see Wabe v. Warrington, 216
Wis. 603, 607, 258 N. W. 497, 498 (I935).
4. Bowman v. Williams, 164 Md. 397, I65 Atl. 182 (1933), 82 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
7o; Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (I935) ; Ham-
brook v. Stokes, (i925) i K. B. 141. Contra: Sanderson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 88
Minn. 162, 92 N. W. 542 (i902); Nuckles v. Tennessee Elec. Pwr. Co., i55 Tenn. 6II,
299 S. W. 775 (1927) ; Waube v. Warrington, 216 Wis. 6o3, 258 N. W. 497 (i935).
See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts (1936) 49
H.Rv. L. REv. 1033, supporting the decision in the Waube case. See Note (1925) 73
U. oF PA. L. REV. 28o, discussing the problem in the Hambrook case and giving the
state of the authorities on this question.
5. The court does not distinguish between worry due to property loss and worry
due to possible harm to strangers.
6. See supra note 2.
7. In the following cases plaintiff was threatened with physical harm and hence
they must be distinguished: Cashin v. Northern Pac. R. R., 96 Mont. 92, 28 P. (2d)
862 (I934) ; Hanford v. Omaha & C. B. R. R., 113 Neb. 423, 203 N. W. 642 (1925) ;
Netusil v. Novak, 12o Neb. 751, 235 N. W. 335 (1931); Pankopf v. Hinkley, i41 Wis.
146, 123 N. W. 625 (1909) ; Sundquist v. Madison R. R., 197 Wis. 83, 221 N. W. 392
(1928). In Watson v. Dilts, II6 Iowa 249, 89 N. W. io68 (1902) and Chiuchiolo v.
New England Wholesale Tailors, 84 N. H. 329, I5O Atl. s4o (1930), the conduct com-
plained of was clearly calculated to cause physical disorders through fright and hence
could be decided without recourse to the special rules governing emotional disturbance.
In Frazee v. Western Dairy Products, 182 Wash. 578, 47 P. (2d) 1037 (i935) the
court specifically upholds Cherry v. General Pet. Corp., 172 Wash. 688, 21 P. (2d)
520 (1933), which denied recovery for a nervous breakdown resulting from worry over
threatened property. See also HARPa, ToRTs § 67; Throckmorton, supra note i, at 280.
8. Throckmorton, supra note I, at 279.
9. Magruder, supra note 4, at 1036.
RECENT CASES
the action does not still depend on negligence law. For the plaintiff to
recover, it should be found that the conduct of the defendant involved a
foreseeable, substantial risk of harm to the particular interest of the plain-
tiff which was in fact invaded.10 Unless this is first determined, there is no
need to inquire into the question of legal cause.11 Negligence in the air is
not enough.12  In the instant case recovery was allowed for personal
injuries without a finding that the defendant was negligent as to the dairy-
man's person. The court's failure to distinguish between the interest in
property and the interest in personal safety, establishes a precedent under
which a finding of general negligence will support damage to an interest in
respect to which there was no foreseeable risk of harm and hence no
negligence. Plaintiff had two distinct causes of action which were joined
in one suit.' 8 In her action to recover for the death of the dairyman, the
essential element of negligence was lacking. But instead of non-suiting
her, the court borrowed the missing element from her action to recover
for property loss as administratrix and granted recovery.
io. Flynn v. Gordon, 86 N. H. 198, 165 Atl. 715 (1933); Texas & P. R. R. v.
Bigham, go Tex. 223, 38 S. W. 162 (1896) ; HAing, TORTS (1933) §§ 7, 73; RF.sTATE-
IdENT, TORTS (1934) § 281, Comment c and g.
ii. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
12. Ibid.
13. Instant case, first hearing, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N. W. 674 (937).
